The Infrastructure of Independence • Part V of The Price of Power

Europe’s push for autonomy now reaches beyond defence. Payments, cloud services, semiconductors, capital markets, trade and the euro are all part of an effort to reduce strategic dependence on the United States by building alternatives before political leverage becomes economic vulnerability.

Futuristic map of Europe linked by digital, financial, energy, transport, and industrial networks, while frayed U.S.-linked cables recede at the edge.
Europe’s push for autonomy is moving beneath the surface of everyday life, into payments, cloud computing, semiconductors, energy, finance, transport, and the systems that keep the economy running.

Europe’s attempt to become less dependent on the United States will not be decided by speeches about strategic autonomy. It will be decided by much less dramatic things: who processes a payment, where data are stored, who designs a semiconductor, which currency settles a transaction, where European savings are invested and how many alternative markets European companies can reach.

That is what makes the final stage of Europe’s shift so important. Defence autonomy, examined in Part IV of this series, deals with weapons and military capacity. Economic autonomy requires something broader. Europe needs enough control over the systems beneath its economy that a dispute with another government cannot easily become a threat to essential services.

The European Union has not reached that point. It remains deeply dependent on American technology, financial infrastructure and capital markets. The dollar still dominates global reserves, while U.S. companies remain central to cloud computing, software, payment processing and advanced semiconductors.

Yet Europe is now treating those dependencies as strategic questions rather than simple matters of efficiency.

That is a significant change.

Payments Have Become a Sovereignty Issue

Most Europeans rarely think about the nationality of the network behind a card payment. Visa and Mastercard work, merchants accept them and consumers have little reason to examine the infrastructure beneath the transaction.

European policymakers increasingly do.

The European Central Bank has warned for years that Europe relies too heavily on foreign payment providers. In the euro area, international card schemes such as Visa and Mastercard process about 65 per cent of card payments. Thirteen euro-area countries no longer have a domestic card scheme at all. Mobile payments add another layer of dependence because Apple Pay, Google Pay and PayPal are also controlled by non-European companies.

The concern is no longer framed only around competition fees or consumer choice. The ECB now describes payment infrastructure as part of Europe’s strategic autonomy. If access to critical services can be affected by foreign law, foreign sanctions or political pressure, then the ability to make ordinary payments becomes a sovereignty issue.

Europe took a concrete step on September 30. Bizum in Spain, Bancomat in Italy, Wero, MB WAY and Vipps MobilePay announced the European Network for Payments, or ENP. The founding systems serve roughly 130 million users across 13 European countries. They plan to connect existing national payment systems through a common European layer, starting with person-to-person transfers before expanding toward e-commerce and point-of-sale payments.

This is not yet a European replacement for Visa or Mastercard. It still needs merchant adoption, technical integration and enough scale to become economically self-sustaining.

The significance is that Europe has stopped treating fragmentation as permanent.

Instead of waiting for one company to build a new continental network from scratch, ENP will connect payment systems that Europeans already use. The project is designed around European standards and instant account-to-account transfers. Its purpose is explicitly linked to reducing dependence on American payment networks.

The ECB’s proposed digital euro could reinforce the same trend. It would not replace cash or private bank accounts. The current plan is for a public digital form of the euro distributed through banks and payment providers, with the ECB saying it could strengthen Europe’s ability to make digital payments without depending entirely on foreign infrastructure. The ECB is working toward possible implementation around 2029, but the project still requires the necessary European legislation before issuance can proceed.

That distinction matters. Europe has not built payment independence yet.

It has decided that payment independence is worth building.

The Cloud Has Become Strategic Infrastructure

Cloud computing creates a similar problem on a much larger scale.

Modern governments, hospitals, banks, energy systems and companies increasingly depend on remote computing infrastructure. Much of that market is controlled by American firms, particularly Amazon Web Services, Microsoft and Google.

Europe benefited from those companies because they offered scale that domestic providers could not easily match. The problem arises when efficiency becomes concentration.

In June, the European Commission proposed a new technological sovereignty package covering cloud computing, artificial intelligence, semiconductors and open-source software. The Commission said Europe remained heavily dependent on non-EU suppliers for core digital technologies and needed more domestic capacity to protect resilience and choice.

The proposals include the Cloud and AI Development Act and Chips Act 2.0. Both are proposals rather than completed law. They still require negotiation with member states and the European Parliament.

Their direction is nevertheless clear.

Brussels wants more European computing capacity and stronger sovereignty requirements for sensitive systems. In sectors such as banking, health, energy and government, officials increasingly question whether Europe should rely almost entirely on infrastructure controlled outside its own jurisdiction.

Reuters reported in June that the Commission’s proposals were aimed directly at reducing dependence on American Big Tech. U.S. cloud providers have already responded by offering more localized European services and stronger controls over where data are stored and who can access them.

That response illustrates how autonomy can work without exclusion.

Europe does not need to remove Amazon, Microsoft or Google from its market. It can use regulation and procurement to demand greater local control while also helping European providers compete.

As with defence, the goal is not necessarily separation.

It is bargaining power.

Chips Are the Weak Link Beneath Everything Else

Europe’s semiconductor problem is even harder.

Chips sit inside almost every strategic system: cars, communications networks, medical equipment, artificial intelligence, weapons, industrial machinery and energy infrastructure. Europe has important semiconductor companies and remains strong in some parts of the supply chain, but it depends heavily on other countries for leading-edge fabrication and design.

The original European Chips Act tried to attract investment and raise Europe’s share of global semiconductor production. The Commission followed it in June 2026 with a proposed Chips Act 2.0, which explicitly identifies dependence on third countries in advanced manufacturing and chip design as a strategic vulnerability.

The new proposal focuses less on simply building factories and more on the complete supply chain. Europe wants stronger domestic demand, more advanced production and better resilience when foreign supply is disrupted.

That ambition remains difficult.

Semiconductor manufacturing is extraordinarily expensive. Europe cannot recreate every part of the global chip industry within its borders, nor would doing so necessarily make economic sense. Advanced chipmaking depends on complex international supply chains that include American design firms, Taiwanese manufacturing, Dutch lithography equipment, Japanese materials and numerous specialist suppliers.

Strategic autonomy therefore does not mean autarky.

Europe’s objective is to avoid reaching a point where another government can cut off a critical technology with no viable alternative.

That is a lower bar than independence, but a much more realistic one.

Computing Capacity Is Starting to Move Home

Europe is also investing in the computers needed to run advanced artificial intelligence and scientific systems.

On October 1, Reuters reported that French state-owned supercomputer manufacturer Bull had doubled production capacity at its Angers factory. The expansion forms part of a wider European programme that is investing billions in high-performance computing and AI infrastructure. Bull built Germany’s JUPITER system, Europe’s first exascale supercomputer, and says European-made components now account for about 70 per cent of its systems.

Europe still relies on important American technology within those machines. Nvidia processors and other foreign components remain central to advanced computing.

But the industrial logic is familiar.

If Europe owns more of the manufacturing, integration, software and infrastructure surrounding the technology, it becomes harder for any single foreign supplier to control the entire system.

The same logic runs through payments, cloud services and chips.

Autonomy grows by removing single points of failure.

Europe Wants Its Savings to Work at Home

Europe also has a financial problem that has little to do with a shortage of money.

European households save enormous amounts, but much of that money remains in bank deposits or flows into financial markets outside the continent. The European Commission estimates that about 70 per cent of EU household savings, worth roughly €10 trillion, sit in bank deposits rather than being invested directly through capital markets.

That creates a strange imbalance. Europe has abundant savings but often struggles to finance companies as they grow. Young European technology firms frequently turn to American capital markets because the United States offers deeper pools of venture capital and more integrated financial markets.

The EU’s Savings and Investments Union is meant to change that. Its purpose is to make it easier for European savings to finance European businesses and infrastructure while giving households more investment choices. The programme also aims to reduce fragmentation between national capital markets.

This may sound far removed from geopolitics, but it is central to economic independence.

A continent can subsidize chip factories and cloud providers, but those companies still need private capital. If European firms must continually turn to American investors and American exchanges to scale, Europe retains another structural dependence.

The Commission is not proposing to keep European money inside Europe by force.

It is trying to make Europe a more competitive place to invest it.

That is much harder than announcing an industrial fund, but it could prove more important over time.

The Euro Is Part of the Same Strategy

The dollar remains one of America’s greatest structural advantages.

As Part I of this series examined, global demand for dollar assets lowers financing costs for the United States and gives Washington influence across the international financial system. Europe cannot simply declare the euro a rival and expect central banks, companies and investors to switch.

It can make the euro more useful.

On September 28, ECB President Christine Lagarde announced plans to expand the network of mechanisms that allow foreign central banks to obtain euros during periods of financial stress. The ECB already maintains swap arrangements with major central banks and has received nearly 30 applications for a separate euro repo facility.

Lagarde linked the effort to the need for a stronger and more sovereign euro area. Reuters reported that the initiative comes amid concern about financial fragmentation and uncertainty surrounding the dollar’s future international role under the Trump administration.

No serious evidence suggests the euro is about to displace the dollar.

That is not necessary for the policy to matter.

Every transaction conducted in euros, every foreign institution that can obtain emergency euro liquidity and every asset held in euros slightly increases Europe’s financial room to manoeuvre.

Once again, autonomy does not require replacing America.

It requires alternatives.

Trade Diversification Provides Those Alternatives

Trade policy may be the most visible part of Europe’s effort to create them.

The European Union now describes diversification as part of economic security. In February, European Council President António Costa said EU leaders had agreed on the need to identify strategic dependencies and address them through diversification. He also emphasized the importance of an open trade policy that spreads European relationships across more markets.

The practical results are substantial.

The EU-Mercosur interim trade agreement began provisional application on May 1, creating a trading area covering roughly 700 million people. The EU signed modernized agreements with Mexico in May. Negotiations with India concluded in January and with Australia in March, while the Commission has moved the Indonesia agreement toward signature and ratification.

These negotiations did not all begin because of Trump. Some took years or decades. Mercosur, for example, has an exceptionally long history of negotiation.

What changed is their strategic value.

When access to the U.S. market becomes less predictable, additional markets become more important. A European company with customers across Latin America, India, Southeast Asia and Australia is less exposed to a tariff dispute with any single partner.

The same applies to raw materials and supply chains.

The Commission says the Mexico agreement is intended in part to strengthen access to critical raw materials, while the Indonesia agreement is designed to improve security of energy and raw-material supply chains.

Europe is therefore using trade in the opposite way from economic isolation.

It is seeking autonomy through more connections, not fewer.

That may be the most important distinction in the entire strategy.

Independence Does Not Mean Isolation

The word “autonomy” can easily become misleading.

Europe is not attempting to build an economy sealed off from the United States, China or the rest of the world. Such a project would be economically destructive and probably impossible.

Instead, the EU is trying to reduce situations in which one outside country controls something Europe cannot function without.

A payment system should have alternatives. A cloud provider should have competitors. A semiconductor supply chain should have redundancy. European businesses should have access to several major export markets. European governments should be able to raise capital and settle transactions without relying exclusively on institutions outside Europe.

That is not economic nationalism in its simplest form.

It is diversification applied to sovereignty.

There are costs. European alternatives may initially be more expensive. Building duplicate infrastructure can reduce efficiency. Political pressure to favour European companies can slide into protectionism if policymakers stop demanding competitive products.

Europe also remains fragmented. Twenty-seven governments do not always agree on procurement, taxation, investment or technology. National interests can undermine continental projects as easily as foreign competition can.

None of those problems changes the direction of travel.

From Dependence to Choice

The five articles in The Price of Power describe the same system from different directions.

The United States built extraordinary advantages after the Second World War because allies were willing to organize much of their economic and security life around American power. Europe became a market for American companies, a customer for American weapons, a holder of dollar assets and a partner inside institutions led by Washington.

That system worked because dependence on the United States was widely regarded as compatible with European interests.

America First has complicated that assumption.

Tariffs have shown that access to the American market can become leverage. Disputes over NATO have forced governments to reconsider how much military dependence is prudent. The Greenland confrontation showed that economic pressure could be directed at a close ally. Technology competition has reminded Europe that the infrastructure underneath an economy can carry political consequences.

Europe’s answer has not been to break with America.

It has been to build options.

Part IV showed that process beginning inside the defence industry. Part V shows that it runs much deeper. Payments, cloud computing, semiconductors, capital markets, the euro and trade relationships are all becoming part of the same strategic calculation.

Some of these projects may fail. Others will take years to reach meaningful scale. Europe will continue to use American technology and invest in American markets even if every current initiative succeeds.

The important change is the objective.

For most of the postwar era, European dependence strengthened American power because Europe had relatively little reason to fear that dependence itself.

Europe is now building an economy in which it hopes to have more choices.

That is what genuine strategic autonomy looks like. It is not the moment Europe stops working with the United States.

It is the moment Europe can afford to say no.

Sources

European Central Bank — Europe’s reliance on foreign payment providers and the role of the digital euro in strategic autonomy. The digital euro and monetary autonomy

Reuters — Creation of the European Network for Payments, linking systems serving roughly 130 million users across 13 countries. European payments groups join forces

European Commission — June 2026 technological sovereignty package covering cloud, AI, semiconductors and open source. European Technological Sovereignty Package

European Commission — Chips Act 2.0 proposal addressing dependence in semiconductor design and advanced manufacturing. Chips Act 2.0 proposal

European Commission — Savings and Investments Union and efforts to channel more European savings into productive investment. Savings and Investments Union

Reuters — ECB plans to expand euro liquidity arrangements and strengthen the euro’s international role. ECB eyes new currency safety nets

European Council — February 2026 agreement to map strategic dependencies and address them through diversification. European Council leaders’ retreat

European Commission — Current EU trade-agreement programme, including Mercosur, Mexico, India, Australia and Indonesia. EU trade policy and recent agreements

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